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Abstract—This paper presents a novel solution to the problem
of determining the ownership of carved information found on disk
drives and other storage media that have been used by more than
one person. When a computer is subject to forensic examination,
information may be found that cannot be readily ascribed to a spe-
cific user. Such information is typically not located in a specific file
or directory, but is found through file carving, which recovers data
from unallocated disk sectors. Because the data is carved, it does
not have associated file system metadata, and its owner cannot be
readily ascertained. The technique presented in this paper starts by
automatically recovering both file system metadata as well as ex-
tended metadata embedded in files (for instance, embedded times-
tamps) directly from a disk image. This metadata is then used to
find exemplars and to create a machine learning classifier that can
be used to ascertain the likely owner of the carved data. The re-
sulting classifier is well suited for use in a legal setting since the
accuracy can be easily verified using cross-validation. Our tech-
nique also results in a classifier that is easily validated by manual
inspection. We report results of the technique applied to both spe-
cific hard drive data created in our laboratory and multiuser drives
that we acquired on the secondary market. We also present a tool
set that automatically creates the classifier and performs valida-
tion.
Index Terms—Data mining, forensics, information security.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ANY computers are routinely used by more than oneperson. Families, roommates, and coworkers frequently
share a single computer. In many schools there are “classroom
computers” that are shared by each teacher that is assigned to
teach in the classroom.
The idea for this research project came from an investigation
of child pornography discovered on a computer that was shared
by two different teachers. The pornography was not found in
files or directories belonging to one user or the other: instead,
it was found in a deleted file for which the original name and
owner could not be determined. This commonly happens when
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a file is deleted and the original directory entry is overwritten,
forcing the file to be recovered through file carving [10], [15].
The computer forensics investigator assigned to the case was
given the task of trying to establish whether the pornography
had been downloaded by user A or user B. We call this process
the owner ascription problem. Before we completed this re-
search, there was no principled procedure for performing this
ascription. Instead, the forensics examiner solved the problem
by trying to find specific features of the file that were in common
with other files on the computer that could be ascribed to user A
or user B. Once a few common features were found, a match was
declared. Unfortunately, this process is error-prone, because it
considers neither all of the available features nor all of the avail-
able files to which the file in question can be matched.
The problem of ascription is neither new nor unique to
digital security and forensics. Since the 18th century, scholars
have attempted to alternately assign or repudiate authorship
of Shakespeare’s plays and poems. Unlike text attribution,
however, forensic investigators are frequently asked to ascribe
not authorship, but agency—that is, the police investigator in
the pornography case needed to infer which of the computer’s
two authorized users had placed the digital photographs on the
computer’s hard drive, not the identity of the photographer.
Based on our interactions with the forensic investigator, we
developed an automated approach for ascribing carved data to
a specific user of a multiuser computer system. Our approach is
superior to the manual approach because it considered all of the
available data on the computer’s hard drive, and because it gives
an error rate that is specific to the hard drive in question. Thus,
unlike the investigator’s procedure, our approach is compliant
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Daubert ruling, which holds that
scientific methods used in court must have a “known or potential
rate of error,” [18] and must be subjected to empirical testing,
which we perform in this paper.
Our approach combines automated feature extraction com-
bined with straightforward application of unsupervised machine
learning. The approach specifically does not rely upon the ex-
aminer to chose which features to use, because few examiners
would have the necessary knowledge to do so, and the most
effective features may vary from drive to drive. Instead, the
approach uses all of the available features that our tools can
extract, and determines the accuracy of the resultant classifier
using leave-one-out validation.
A. Hypothesis and Contributions
We hypothesize that there are characteristic similarities
among all information deposited on a storage device used by a
computer user, and that these characteristics will have different
U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright.
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(and unique) values for different computer users—even when
the users are using the same computer. We further hypothesize
that these characteristics can be identified and used to automat-
ically ascribe residual information to the user responsible for
the information’s presence.
In this paper, we demonstrate the approach using both real-
istic data that was created in the laboratory, as well as real data
that was obtained from secondary computers purchased on the
secondary market. For each drive, we construct a classifier using
all of the available data on the disk except for one file; we then
use the classifier to classify the file that has been left out. We
then repeat this process for every file on the disk. This technique,
called leave-one-out validation, produces a confusion table that
shows how the classifiers classified the files known to belong
to each user. We assume that carved data would classify with
similar accuracy rates, since the only difference between carved
data and resident files is that carved data was once a file that
was subsequently deleted. (On systems that have high levels of
system activity or disks that are nearly filled, it is likely that
carved data will have been recently deleted. But on systems that
have low levels of system activity or disks that are mostly empty,
carved data can be quite old—it may even predate the disk’s file
system.)
By making a modification to the approach and generating ad-
ditional confusion tables after each modification, we are able to
increase the overall accuracy of the approach. Additional testing
shows that these improvements are reflected in many drives that
are tested.
Because our approach tests the hypothesis on every hard drive
to which it is applied, it produces different accuracy and error
rates for different hard drives. This is as it should be: some hard
drives have data that cluster well, while other hard drives have
data that do not.
Our approach does not say whether or not a specific file was
created by a specific user—it only reports how well the file clus-
ters with other files created by that user. In drives with high ac-
curacy rates, the results could be reported in court for the trier
of fact to consider. In cases where the leave-one-out validation
shows low accuracy, the results are inconclusive and should not
be reported in court or used as the basis of a future investigation.
For obvious reasons, we do not report the results of applying
the approach to actual case data.
B. Importance and Applicability
The contribution in this paper is both important to the
matter at hand and applicable to other situations. Although it is
certainly common for business professionals to have a laptop
and/or a desktop computer for their exclusive use, even today
it is relatively common for a single computer to be used by
multiple individuals. This is the case in many schools, where
a single classroom or laboratory computer might have several
authorized users. It is also common in many families, as well
as in libraries, hospitals, and Internet cafes.
Another way for a computer to be used by more than one
person is for the computer to be stolen and later recovered. Fi-
nally, although the automated approach described in this paper
is only applied to a single computer, we believe that it could be
applied to multiple computers or to ascribing information found
on cloud-based servers or portable storage devices. We will dis-
cuss this possibility more in Section VII-D4.
C. Related Work
Very little work has been done in the area of automated file
ascription for multiuser hard drives, but there has been a lot
of research into ascription in the broader sense, which we dis-
cuss briefly here. There are also manual techniques which law
enforcement currently uses to perform ascription, although we
have been unable to find any publicly available descriptions of
these procedures.
Cross-Drive Analysis: The initial work on automated
forensic feature extraction was part of Garfinkel’s Cross-Drive
Analysis and Forensic Feature Extraction [5]. Garfinkel’s work
was primarily concerned with the identification of previously
unknown social networks or links between individuals and
organizations, rather than the ascription of content discovered
on drives.
Text Mining for Ascription: One common method of as-
cribing documents to a specific person is to apply statistical
linguistic techniques to the content [9]. This technique has
been used with a great deal of success for ascribing historical
documents (for instance, the authors of the disputed Federalist
Papers [16], [1]). But this technique is only effective for text,
not for general computer usage and files. It is only for ascribing
the creator of content, rather than the owner.
Lazy Decision Trees: The approach of creating a decision tree
based on the data being tested was introduced as Lazy Decision
Trees (LazyDT) by Friedman, Kohavi, and Yun [4]. As with our
use of C4.5, LazyDT builds a decision tree for each instance to
be classified, ignoring dimensions of the data set that are missing
in the instance. In their paper, LazyDT is shown to outperform
C4.5 by approximately 2%, largely because of its improved han-
dling of missing values. Given that we are also handling missing
values, the main advantage of adopting LazyDT would most
likely be improved performance.
Accountability Systems: Although there exist practical sys-
tems for achieving accountability in distributed systems such
as PeerReview [8], these systems require the use of specialized
software or runtime environments. Computer crime investiga-
tors do not have the luxury of deciding the software that will be
used by offenders. Although systems may exist that eliminate
the multiuser carved data ascription problem through the use of
append-only logging file systems, offenders are more likely to
be using computers running Microsoft Windows or MacOS.
Willassen’s Ph.D. thesis [19] discusses the use of native
timestamps on modern computer systems to improve oppor-
tunities for evidence reconstruction and user accountability.
Willassen discusses the fundamental problem with using times-
tamps—that they are sometimes subject to manipulation by
the user—and proposes approaches for resolving that problem
through the use of a hypothesis-based approach. In his thesis,
Williassen only applies his approaches to systems that are used
by a single user. If they were extended to multiuser systems,
those approaches could be used in conjunction with the tech-
nique that we introduce in the remainder of the paper.
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D. Outline of Paper
This paper introduces an important problem that confronts
computer forensic investigators, but which has been largely ig-
nored by developers of forensic tools: how to automatically
ascribe information found on a subject computer to a specific
user when that computer has been used by multiple individuals
(Section II). We propose a novel solution based on automated
feature extraction and machine learning, and evaluate the solu-
tion on two “realistic” hard drive disk images consisting of data
generated by experimenters playing the role of multiple users
(Section III). The approach is refined through the use of dimen-
sional reduction—specifically by projecting all of the times-
tamps associated with user activity present in the metadata to
a single timeline (Section V). We then validate the technique
using a set of real disks with real user data that were purchased
on the secondary market (Section VI).
Section VIII presents our conclusions, including applications
to current law enforcement tasks and the opportunities for future
work.
II. MULTIUSER CARVED DATA ASCRIPTION PROBLEM
Carved data can be tremendously important in forensic inves-
tigations. But when a computer is used by more than one person,
carving can present the examiner with a difficult problem. Data
that is recovered through carving does not have an associated
file name, file system timestamps, ownership, file permissions,
or other file system metadata that might be used to connect the
data with one of the computer’s users. Carved data must, as a re-
sult, be manually attributed, or ascribed, to a specific individual.
Consider the case of a classroom computer used by teacher1
during lunch on Mondays and Tuesdays and by teacher2 during
lunch on Wednesdays and Thursdays. If the computer is subject
to a forensic examination on Friday and child pornography is
found through file carving, there is no readily apparent way to
ascribe the pornography to either teacher1 or teacher2.
We call this problem the multiuser carved data ascription
problem (hereafter shortened to the “Ascription Problem”). In
the area of law enforcement, the Ascription Problem arises when
a single computer is used by multiple individuals. This can be
the case when two people share one computer, or when a com-
puter is stolen, used by a second person, and later subjected to
a forensic inspection. When the defendant claims “The other
person put the data there,” the investigator’s only recourse is to
find some kind of information that ties the carved data to the sus-
pect. This additional information can be file system metadata,
file placement information, and embedded file metadata:
File system metadata is information stored by the file
system externally to the file—for example, the modifica-
tion time of files. By assembling all of the timestamps that
are ascribable to each individual that has used the storage
device, it is possible to create a timeline that indicates when
each person used the device.
File placement information is the physical sector num-
bers where data is stored. This is useful in situations where
a region of the device was used to preferentially store files
belonging to one user.
Embedded file metadata is information found inside
the carved data itself. For example, many digital cameras
store the camera’s serial number inside each image that
the camera takes. Finding a serial number in JPEGs that
are clearly ascribable to one user and finding the same
serial number in a carved JPEG would link the carved
JPEG to the user.
Finding, tabulating, and evaluating all of the available meta-
data, both embedded and from the file system, is a daunting task
with the amount of data and diversity of data types on a typ-
ical hard drive (see Table I). This task can be complicated by
the fact that there may be conflicting information on the storage
device—some metadata that implicates one user, and some that
implicates another. With manual correlation an analyst can try to
evaluate all of the available metadata and claim that one person
is guilty and another is innocent, but doing so is a mind-numbing
and error-prone exercise. Manual examination also makes the
examination extraordinarily invasive.
III. BASIC APPROACH
Our approach automates the procedure outlined above, using
specialized metadata extractors and automated classification
techniques to process the drive:
1) Forensic software analyzes the disk image and locates all
of the ascribable exemplar files—recoverable allocated and
deleted files in the file system for which the owner can be
reliably ascertained.
2) For each exemplar, file system metadata and file placement
information is gathered from the intact file system, and em-
bedded metadata is gathered using format-specific meta-
data extractors. All of this information for all of the exem-
plars is combined into a single file.
3) The data is preprocessed.
4) The exemplars are used to train a classifier.
5) The classifer’s accuracy is determined using leave-one-out
validation.
6) The carved data that needs to be ascribed is processed with
the metadata extraction system.
7) Finally, the carved data’s metadata and placement informa-
tion is processed using the classification system.
We will now discuss each step in detail.
A. Disk Image Analysis and Feature Extraction
We created a program called fiwalk [6] (file and inode
walker) to ingest each disk image, automatically process all par-
titions that might be present in the disk image, examine all of
the files and inodes in each one, and produce an output file con-
sisting of a list of each file (both allocated and deleted) and all
collected metadata. During the disk image analysis, metadata is
collected for each file. Collected file system metadata includes
each file’s name, the file create, modify, access and inode change
times, the file’s location in the disk image, the number of frag-
ments.
The embedded metadata is extracted from each intact file
using fiwalk’s metadata extraction system [14]. For this
paper, we use metadata extractor plug-ins for Microsoft Office,
OpenOffice, JPEG, and other multimedia file formats. An
example of the variety extractable metadata attributes is shown
in Fig. 1.
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TABLE I
ACTUAL ATTRIBUTES AND THEIR TYPES EXTRACTED FROM THE DOMEXUSERS DISK IMAGE USING FIWALK. SOME OF THESE ATTRIBUTES ARE FILE SYSTEM
METADATA, SOME ARE FILE PLACEMENT INFORMATION, BUT MOST ARE EMBEDDED FILE METADATA EXTRACTED FROM DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHS, DIGITAL
MUSIC, AND MICROSOFT OFFICE FILE FORMATS. ALL ATTRIBUTES ARE PROVIDED TO THE MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHM; THERE IS NO MANUAL PRUNING
The embedded metadata extracted is sparse and has many
missing values. For example, the typical Microsoft Word file
might contain metadata consisting of the author and organiza-
tion, creation time, last printed time, and so on. For a digital
image, the metadata might include the shutter speed and camera
serial number. Clearly, Word files will not have JPEG metadata,
and vice-versa. Although attributes with many missing values
can be a problem for some machine learning algorithms, our im-
plementation needs to focus on these attributes as they are fre-
quently correlated with the circumstances surrounding the doc-
ument’s creation and use.
B. Exemplar Selection
Exemplars are selected from the disk image based on the
availablity of file system metadata denoting file ownership. Our
system currently determines the owner from the name of the
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Fig. 1. Examples of features used by the automated ascription system.
containing directory. For example, the system infers that the
Windows file /Documents and Settings/sally/My
Documents/Presentation.ppt is owned by the user
“sally” and the Macintosh file /Users/jason/house.jpg
is owned by “jason.” Currently our system ignores Unix and
Windows file permissions and access control lists, because
of incomplete support for this metadata by Sleuth Kit [2], on
which fiwalk relies.
C. Feature Selection
For this work, our algorithm employs no specific feature se-
lection, weighting or biasing, although the C4.5 algorithm im-
plicitly determines which are the most important features to use
when it constructs a decision tree. Our goal for this research is
to allow the automated ascription of carved data—for example,
a system that could be run in a police station by an forensic ex-
aminer with no formal training in data mining. We would like
to have the system automatically determine if, for example, the
serial number of JPEGs or a custom Microsoft Word metadata
field from a document management system should be consid-
ered as part of the ascription process. Because there are hun-
dreds of extractable features on a typical hard drive, we con-
clude that the best approach is to simply use all of the features
and allow the algorithm to determine which features are the most
useful. Although in the future it might be possible to increase the
accuracy of this technique with some kind of automated feature
selection or weighting, our experience will show that such au-
tomation is not necessary to achieve reliable results.
D. Data Preprocessing
Taking into account the preceding, our data preprocessing
consists of these steps:
1) The owner of each file is determined using the algorithm
described above to extract the owner from the file path.
This owner is added to the ARFF file as a new attribute
for each file.
2) Attributes that are unique for each entry (the fiwalk id,
filename, and file hashes) that cannot be used to link files
together are discarded.
3) All string attributes are converted to nominal attributes to
work around a limitation in our datamining toolkit.
4) All file system metadata timestamps (crtime, ctime,
mtime, andatime) are removed from the test set, as these
timestamps are not available in carved data.1
E. Building and Testing the Classification System
Once metadata is extracted from all the exemplars, we train
a set of machine learning classifiers using Weka [20], a freely
available program that implements customizable versions of a
wide variety of machine learning algorithms.2
After preprocessing, we train and test multiple classi-
fiers on the data using leave-one-out validation. (Please see
Section III-G to explain our choice of leave-one-out validation.)
Because metadata is not directly associated with the process that
overwrites directory entries (which forces undeleting/carving
of files), we postulate that carved files, undeleted files, and
allocated files will all have a similar distribution of metadata.
We derive from this postulate the implication that validation
accuracy is the best measure of the success of the classifier.
We display the results of the validation runs in a confusion
matrix in Tables VII –XII. Each row of these tables shows how
the files that were ascribed to each user would be ascribed if the
ownership information is removed: the boxed number along the
diagonals of the tables present the correct classifications. The
last row of the table presents the percentage of correct classifi-
cations for each classification group. We also compute the “av-
erage accuracy” of the classifier, which we define as the average
of the individual classification accuracies for each user.
In actual use to ascribe carved data we would finally construct
a classifier using all of the exemplars in the disk image.fiwalk
would be run again, this time with a special “carving” input
file that documents the specific sector locations inside the disk
image containing information to be carved. (The format of this
carving input file is identical to the output format of the log file
created by the popular Scalpel file carver [10].)
F. Classifiers Used: KNN and C4.5
We tested two classification algorithms, K-Nearest Neighbor
(KNN) and C4.5 decision trees (called “J48” by Weka). These
two algorithms were selected for their ability to deal with high-
dimensionality, heterogeneous data sets in which instances of
a class are not contiguous, which is characteristic of our input
data. For instance, one user may use the computer for an hour,
followed by another user for two hours, and then a return to
the first user, resulting in two distinct noncontiguous timelines
when a file is likely to be created by the first user.
1) KNN: KNN is a simple data mining technique in which
all data elements are mapped into a multidimensional space.
Input elements are classified according to the type of the nearest
1File system metdata is available for orphan files; experiments not presented
here indicate that using this additional metadata increases accuracy.
2To facilitate interoperability with Weka, we modified fiwalk so that it
could directly output the results of the extraction as an Attribute Relation File
Format (ARFF) file.
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exemplar (in the case of ), or some kind of voting function
of the nearest-neighbors. (See Dasarathy [3] for a complete
discussion.) We consider KNN’s simplicity to be an advantage
when attempting to explain this process to a magistrate or a jury.
It is easy to explain that a JPEG file in question is likely to belong
to the defendant because it has the same serial number or camera
settings as other files that are known to belong to the defendant,
or that a Word file is likely to belong to a person because it
has a document print-time that is within 3 seconds of another
file’s print time. We believe that it would be harder to explain
a complex decision tree. At the same time, it can be seen as
additional confirmation when both KNN and C4.5 produce the
same conclusion.
The version of KNN that ships with Weka uses a class known
as EuclideanDistance for determining the distance be-
tween two instances. This distance function has two deficiencies
that made it perform poorly here. First, missing values result
in a maximal distance for the dimension of the missing value.
Second, timestamps, which are the a priori most promising fea-
ture for file ascription, are ignored by Weka’s Euclidean-
Distance distance function. With these issues in mind, we
crafted a replacement class for measuring distance, called Rea-
sonableEuclideanDistance. Our distance function ig-
nores missing values in distance calculations, and converts time
stamps into seconds. All dimensions are then normalized to the
range [0,1].
2) C4.5 Decision Trees (J48): J48 is an open-source imple-
mentation of Quinlan’s C4.5 algorithm for developing decision
trees [17]. The algorithm attempts to find attributes in the data
that split the exemplars into subsets that have more variation in
the parameter to be classified than the original pool. Although
C4.5 produced better results than KNN, it has two distinct dis-
advantages:
a) It is necessary to build each C4.5 classifier based on the
specific attributes available in the carved data: it makes no
sense to build a highly accurate classifier that uses the Mi-
crosoft Office “Last-Printed” time if one is attempting to
classify a JPEG for which Last-Printed time is not avail-
able.
b) Although one of the attractive features of a decision tree is
the ability to explain the reasoning behind its predictions,
in our runs, the algorithm produced decision trees that
were perplexing and could be difficult for even an expert
to explain (Fig. 2). This might complicate the use of the
C4.5 algorithm in a court room.
Because KNN may be legally superior while C4.5 produces
superior validity, we present the results of both algorithms
throughout this paper. For this reason, we recommend pre-
senting the results of both algorithms.
A reviewer of a previous draft of this paper suggested that per-
plexing decision trees may be a result of over-fitting. Although
this may be the case, we believe that over-fitting is not a relevant
concern for the classification task that we present in this paper.
Overfitting is a risk in machine learning when training data
is rare or when there are random processes that are present in
the training data that is not present in the test data that is being
classified. However, in this case, the training data and the test
data are drawn from the same sample—the subject’s hard drive.
In many cases, the only difference between the training data and
the test data is that the test data was in a file that was deleted and
the file’s directory entry was substantially overwritten. The test
data was subject to the same seemingly random processes as the
rest of the training data. Thus, overfitting is not a concern.
G. Classifier Validation
Data mining performance is typically evaluated using ten-
fold cross validation [11], a process in which the data is divided
into ten equal parts (or “folds”). Ten classifiers are then created,
each with one tenth of the data held out. Each classifier is then
used to classify the data that is held out, the process being re-
peated ten times.
Leave-one-out is an alternative validation approach. This ap-
proach works similarly to ten-fold cross validation, but instead
of holding out 10% of the data as a test set, a single instance
is held out each time, and each other instance is used to train
the classifier. This approach is less favored than the ten-fold ap-
proach because it takes significantly longer to perform, and be-
cause it produces a result that is highly biased to the specific
data set being used by the classifer.
We feel that leave-one-out validation is a more accurate
model to our problem at hand, since we are not attempting
to create a general purpose classifer: we are trying to create
a general purpose classification technique, but the classifier
produced by this technique will only be used once—to ascribe
data based on the very hard drive from which the classifier was
created.
Given the high proportion of training data to test data, leave-
one-out (in this scenario) produced significantly better classifi-
cation rates than ten-fold cross validation. For instance, if a user
only used the computer to create a handful of files during a cer-
tain time span, and many or all of those files are omitted in the
90% used to train the classifier, then the classifier will perform
poorly on the test set. This can result in suboptimal results from
the the classifier.
Ten-fold validation is commonly used to evaluate data
mining, largely because the datasets are known, and consistent
comparisons are necessary to fairly compare efficacy of new
algorithms and approaches. Leave-one-out is a better match to
the problem at hand, which must stress accuracy over arbitrary
performance concerns. However, for the purpose of comparison
and establishing baselines, we present side-by-side results in
Table III.
IV. RESULTS
Our initial experiments were conducted using the realistic
(and freely redistributable) “domexusers” and “seed1” drive im-
ages from the http://digitalcorpora.org [7] project (Table II). The
“domexusers” disk was created by a researcher alternatively
playing the role of two different computer users that were using
a computer to communicate with a third person. Each fictional
user was given an account; the experimenter toggled between
the two accounts using the “fast user switching” feature built
in to Microsoft XP. The “seed1” disk was created by multiple
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Fig. 2. C4.5 decision tree fragments without and with timeline data.
individuals who sat down at a computer over the course of sev-
eral weeks, each one alternatively browsing the web and down-
loading documents. Table III presents the results of the basic
approach applied to these two disk images.
Working with realistic but synthetic data has two significant
advantages:
1) Since the data can be freely downloaded from the Internet,
synthetic data allows others to replicate our results and at-
tempt to improve on our algorithms [7]. (Although our real
data sets are available to other researchers, the use of that
data set requires that the researchers first receive permis-
sion from their organization’s Institutional Review Board.)
2) The use of synthetic data allows us to report the results here
without the need to obscure or redact any information (as
was necessary for our result tables based upon real data).
For example, some organizations have custom metadata
fields their Microsoft Office documents that are injected by
document control systems or custom-written applications.
If the metadata fields present in Table I were based on real
data, rather than synthetic data created in a laboratory, the
presence of those fields might disclose the name of an or-
ganization from which the drive had been obtained. This
could have negative impacts on both the organization and
one or more of its employees.
The KNN classifier performed poorly with Weka’s Eu-
clidean distance metric, but well using our “Reasonable”
distance metric discussed above (see Table III). Accuracy was
best with and decreased as increased, evidence
that instances of a specific class are rare in any given neigh-
borhood. Our use of KNN was “naïve,” in the sense that we
chose to use each possible metadata attribute as a separate
(and equally important, given the Euclidean basis of proximity
measurement) dimension. The poor performance of ten-fold
cross validation is further evidence of the sparseness of points
within the multidimensional space, a shortcoming of KNN for
this specific problem.
The C4.5 classifier performed quite well in our initial runs.
In our examination of the resulting classifier trees, we were sur-
prised that features such as starting disk sector number were
used in preference to features such as the Microsoft Office em-
bedded “Creator” attribute. We believe that this is because the
C4.5 algorithm builds its classifier by organizing decision nodes
in order of decreasing entropy from the root. On a device with a
wide variety of files, only a few will be of each type, and any em-
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TABLE II
DRIVES USED IN EXPERIMENTS, ALONG WITH THEIR OPERATING SYSTEMS AND FILE SYSTEM TYPE. FILE SYSTEM USAGE FOR USERS WITH THE MOST NUMBER
OF FILES IS ALSO GIVEN (USER #1 IS THE USER WITH THE MOST FILES); FULL INFORMATION REGARDING FILE SYSTEM ALLOCATION CAN BE FOUND
IN THE CONFUSION MATRIX AT THE END OF THIS PAPER
bedded metadata field will be rarely populated—for example,
although “Creator” will be present for Microsoft Office files, it
is not present for JPEG files. This leads to low entropy for em-
bedded attributes over all records, and produces a classifer that
ignores the very attributes that a human analyst would consider
to be the most predictive. Sector number, on the other hand, is
loosely correlated with creation time as the drive is filled, and is
thus correlated with the computer’s operator. A revised C4.5 al-
gorithm specifically designed to work with sparse data sets with
many missing values might score even higher.
We hypothesize that better accuracy could be obtained by
making use of file system timestamps. After all, there is a
wealth of information on these disk images that is being simply
thrown away. Our initial implementation ignores crtime,
ctime, mtime, and atime because these attributes are not
available for carved data. We discuss how to make use of these
timestamps in Section V.
V. USER ACTIVITY TIMELINE
There are many attributes that are timestamps which result
from the activity of a user sitting in front of a computer system.
For example, double-clicking on a file causes the file’s atime
to be updated when it is read. Making a change to the file and
saving it causes the file’s mtime to be updated. Many file types
further have embedded timestamps. Microsoft Office files con-
tain an embedded timestamp of when the file was last saved;
JPEGs contain a timestamp of when the image was “digitized,”
which reflects either when the photograph was snapped or when
the file was edited and saved using an image manipulation tool.
In Section IV, we treated each of these timestamp types as
different dimensions. Yet many of the timestamps correspond
to activity caused by a user sitting in front of a computer system
and manipulating the mouse and keyboard.
In this section, we explore the performance improvement that
results by projecting all of these times onto a single dimension
to create a user activity timeline.
A. Basic Approach
Many file types contain multiple timestamps. The most
straightforward way to use these timestamps is to project them
onto a single timeline indicative of user activity. To do this, we
create a “unified” timeline that contains all of the timestamps
found in ascribable exemplars. If an HTML file belonging
to User A was found to be created at 7:05 P.M., modified at
7:06 P.M., and last accessed at 7:10 P.M., three points associated
to User A will be added to the timeline. Microsoft Office files
may result in up to eight points being added: four points for the
NTFS file system timestamps, and four points corresponding
to embedded timestamps.
The power of the unified timeline is that carved data fre-
quently contains embedded timestamps. By creating a single
unified timeline, we can use file system timestamps to help as-
cribe ownership of carved data, even though file system times-
tamps are not available for carved data.
Consider the case of a carved Microsoft Word file that is
found to have been printed at 10:33 A.M.. Without the unified
timeline, only the print times of other Microsoft Word files could
be used for ascription: if no other Microsoft Word files on the
hard drive had been printed around 10:33 A.M., this information
would be ignored. With the unified timeline, a Notepad file that
was created at 10:32 A.M. could be used to ascribe ownership to
the carved Microsoft Word file, since the print-time of the Word
file and the create time of the Notepad file would be projected
onto the single timeline.
Note that the creation of a unified timeline multiplies the
number of items to be classified, as each file can have a max-
imum of eight times, each of which projects to a different point
on the timeline. As a result, the confusion matrices presented at
the end of this paper have more items that are classified than the
number of files on each device.
Note also that the critical assumption of our user activity time-
line is that only one person is accessing the system at a time. We
have not characterized the behavior of the algorithm when there
are simultaneous accesses to the file system by different users.
B. Timestamp Suppression
Care must be taken when reducing timestamps to a single
dimension, as all timestamps cannot be treated equally:
• Invalid timestamps must be detected and suppressed. Our
system discards timestamps with a date of 0000-00-00
(zero) or 1970-01-01 (the Unix epoch).
• Timestamps originating on systems other than the target
system need to be ignored. For example, timestamps em-
bedded within HTML files should be suppressed, since
they originated on a remote web server. Likewise, times-
tamps embedded within JPEGs should be suppressed if
they originated within a digital camera, as activity within a
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TABLE III
CLASSIFICATION AVERAGE ACCURACY FOR NEAREST NEIGHBOR AND C4.5 ALGORITHMS, AS REPORTED BY LEAVE-ONE-OUT VALIDATION AND TEN-FOLD
CROSS-VALIDATION. REPORTED ACCURACY IS THE AVERAGE OF CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY FOR EACH USER. ALL STATISTICS ARE COMPUTED USING
“REALISTIC” (LABORATORY-CREATED) DISK IMAGES
digital camera is unlikely to be correlated with activity on
the target computer system.
As a result, our timeline system incorporates a number of
media-specific rules, detailed below. Once the timestamps have
been collected and sanitized, a single timeline of system usage
can be created, and this new dimension of aggregated times-
tamps can be used to create a new classifier.
1) Timestamps Within Microsoft Office Rule: Microsoft Of-
fice stores timestamps in four specific metadata fields: Created,
Editing-Duration,3 Last-Print and Last-Modified. These are all
activities that can be used as part of the user activity timeline.4
Because these timestamps are created and maintained by the of-
fice application, rather than the file system, the Office document
creation and modify times can be significantly different from the
file’s creation and modify time. Projecting both sets of times-
tamps onto the user activity timeline makes sense.
2) Timestamps in JPEG EXIF Structures Rule: JPEGs can
contain several timestamps within the EXIF metadata segments,
including “Date and Time,” “Date and Time (original),” “Date
and Time (digitized),” and possibly others.
Because the goal is to create a timeline of computer usage,
timestamps originating within digital cameras should not be
projected onto the common timeline of computer usage.5 In
order to filter out these camera-generated timestamps, our
system examines the EXIF “Manufacturer” and “Model” tags
and only keeps JPEG timestamps if the tags contain the string
“Adobe,” “Windows,” “Macintosh,” or “QuickTime.” In our
testing, the presence of these strings indicates that the JPEG
was processed by image editing software, allowing us to assure
that only the timestamps that result from editing on the host
computer are projected onto the unified timeline.
3) Timestamps From Web Browsers Rule: When a file is
downloaded using a web browser, ideally, we would like the
timestamp to be set to the time of download. But not all browsers
set the time in this fashion. Sometimes the modification time
is set to the time that it was downloaded or written into the
browser cache, which would be most useful for the ascription
task. Sometimes the modification time is set to be the time pro-
vided by the webserver for the document when the document is
3Confusingly, even though the name “Editing-Duration” would seem to imply
a value of time duration, the actual value stored in Word documents is an abso-
lute time.
4While it is likely that other office suites also store timestamps in their
metadata, we did not examine these file formats, as the usage of suites such as
OpenOffice and KOffice is dwarfed by Microsoft Office.
5Of course, if a single camera is used by multiple individuals, the techniques
presented in this paper could be applied to a single camera.
TABLE IV
ACTIONS WHICH PRESERVE TIMESTAMPS RATHER THAN UPDATING THEM
downloaded by HTTP. Table IV documents how the behavior of
different browsers impacts the timestamps of downloaded files.
Although it is frequently possible to determine which web
browser downloaded a particular file (for example, by exam-
ining the browser-specific cache or log files), at this time our
system ignores this information. As a result, downloaded files
can introduce inaccuracies into the timeline. These inaccuracies
could be corrected with additional work.
A deployed system could suppress timestamps on files that
had been downloaded using Safari but retain them on files down-
loaded by Firefox or Internet Explorer. The decision whether or
not to suppress a timestamp can be made based on the filename,
the containing directory, and the installed software.
4) Timestamps From File Copying Rule: Even the simple an
act of file copying can introduce discrepancies into the timeline.
NTFS, for example, tracks the “Create,” “Modify,” “Access,”
and “Entry Modified” time for each entry in the file system.6
With most modern systems, copying a file through the graph-
ical user interface preserves the file’s modification time. Unfor-
tunately, preserving the modification time is not wanted here:
6
“Entry Modified” is the time that the file’s entry in the Master File Table was
modified. It is roughly equivalent to inode ctime in the Unix file system.
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TABLE V
AVERAGE ACCURACY OF THE CLASSIFIERS ON “REALISTIC” DISK IMAGES WITH A UNIFIED TIMELINE (SEE SECTION V)
TABLE VI
APPLICATION OF THE UNIFIED TIMELINE METHOD TO REAL DISK DRIVES
PURCHASED ON THE SECONDARY MARKET. ACCURACY IS COMPUTED WITH
LEAVE-ONE-OUT VALIDATION. “AVERAGE ACCURACY” IS THE AVERAGE OF
THE ACCURACY OF CLASSIFICATION FOR EACH USER. COMPLEX CONFUSION
MATRICES FOR THESE RUNS CAN BE FOUND AT THE END OF THIS PAPER
if User 2 copies a file from User 1’s directory to User 2’s di-
rectory, we would like that file to have a modification time re-
flecting when the file was moved by User 2, not when the file
was modified by User 1. Most operating systems do not provide
this functionality, and thus the mtime of files that are copied (or
moved) from one user’s directory to another user’s directory can
introduce inaccuracies into the ascription project. We have not
determined an appropriate rule for handling this case, although
one may not be needed as file permissions normally prohibit
such copying. Table IV documents how different operating sys-
tems manage the modification or preservation of timestamps.
C. Results With the Unified Timeline
We reran the experiments using a single unified timeline in
addition to the original features using the techniques discussed
above. We found that reducing the dimensionality and merging
semantically similar time information makes the classifier more
accurate in all cases (Table V).
We believe that the reason for this improvement is that there is
a high degree of clustering on the time axis. As a result, adjacent
points on the timeline have good predictive value for the owner
of an unknown point.
In examining the decision trees produced by the C4.5 algo-
rithm, we noted that time was clearly the most important fea-
ture in determining which user to ascribe ownership. In several
cases, other features were not even used. Intuitively this makes
sense, especially on a desktop computer, where there is usually
only a single user in control at any given time. Thus, timestamps
are highly correlated with specific users.7
VI. RESULTS WITH REAL DATA
After improving the results with the user activity timeline,
we tested the technique using disk images from the Real Data
Corpus [7], a collection of more than 2000 disk images made
from hard drives that were purchased on the secondary market.
We selected images with intact file systems for which multiple
7Although it is possible to set up remote logins on a desktop machine and
consequently have multiple concurrent users, in practice both Windows and
MacOS prohibit multiple simultaneous use of the graphical user interface due
to licensing and security concerns.
users could be readily identified. Four appropriate multiuser
disk images were identified (Table II). All were taken from com-
puters running Microsoft Windows and were formatted with
NTFS. Although NTFS has additional file system metadata in-
cluding access control lists, security identifiers, and a sequence
number, we did not use this information for our experiments, so
the use of NTFS does not impact our results.
(The overwhelming number of disk images in the RDC are
from camera cards, CDs, DVDs, and single-user computers. Of
the multiuser computers that we found, many computers could
not be used in this research project because the drive data orig-
inated within the United States.)
The results are summarized in Table VI and presented in
Tables VII –XII. In general, we found that some drives produced
classifiers with higher accuracy rates than others, but that most
of the drives produced classification rates that would be high
enough to be useful in an investigation.
VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
The confusion tables that we present confirm the hypothesis
presented in Section I-A and show that the method presented
here can achieve high accuracy rates under a variety of realistic
and real world conditions.
A. Implications for Law Enforcement
Our complete analysis of the “domexusers” drive (Table VII)
shows that the files on the drive can be ascribed to six different
users: in addition to “domex1” and “domex2,” there are also
files belonging to the Administrator user, to the windows “All
users” user, the “Default User” user, and to two system services,
“LocalService” and “NetworkService.” The bottom row of this
table shows that classifications into these categories were accu-
rate more than 80% of the time in all cases, and more than 95%
of the time for files classified as “Administrator,” “domex1” or
“domex2.” Similarly high rates of classification were seen for
the seed1 (Table VIII), 044 (Table IX), mx7-03 (Table X), and
the mx5-24 (Table XI) drives.
The mx4-18 (Table XII) drive, on the other hand, showed a
relatively low rate of classification accuracy (66.53%) for files
classified as “All Users.” Even files classified as “g” were cor-
rect only 89.78% of the time.
These results have several important implications for the use
of this technique in law enforcement or other analogous situa-
tions:
1) Different hard drives will have different rates of classi-
fication accuracy. The classification accuracy of this tech-
nique depends not just on the technique itself, but on the ac-
tual drive being classified. Some drives will classify well,
while others will not. One of the strengths of this technique
is that we can determine the overall classification accuracy
for the drive.
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TABLE VII
DOMEXUSERS (C4.5) CONFUSION MATRIX
TABLE VIII
SEED1 (C4.5) CONFUSION MATRIX
TABLE IX
0844 (C4.5) CONFUSION MATRIX; NONSYSTEM NAMES ARE BLINDED
2) Different users on a single hard drive will classify
at different rates. Some users may a high regularity
to the information that they deposit on the drive, while
others may have little or no regularity. Again, one of the
advantages of this technique is that we can infer, from
the bottom row of the confusion matrix, the accuracy of
each kind of classification determination. For example,
on the drive mx4-18, only 91.47% of the files classified
as belonging to “administrador” actually belonged to this
user, which means that files ascribed to “administrador”
have roughly a 1-out-of-10 chance of being incorrectly
ascribed. Were this technique presented at a trial, this error
rate should rightfully be presented in court to allow the
jury, judge, or ultimate trier of fact to make an informed
decision.
We believe that the correct way to address these issues is to
present the per-classification accuracy rates when using classi-
fication results in a legal context.
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TABLE X
MX7-03 (C4.5) CONFUSION MATRIX; NONSYSTEM NAMES ARE BLINDED
TABLE XI
MX5-24 (C4.5) CONFUSION MATRIX; NONSYSTEM NAMES ARE BLINDED
B. How Much Accuracy Is Needed?
An anonymous reviewer of a previous version of this paper
asked “Is 90%–95% accuracy sufficient for courtroom evi-
dence?” This is an excellent question. Unfortunately, it is a
question that cannot be answered.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court held in its Daubert ruling
that scientific evidence can only be presented if there is a
“known error rate,” [18], most digital forensic techniques do
not have an error rate [13]. These tools lack an error rate be-
cause they either work or they do not work, so their perceived
error rates are either 0% or 100%.
One of the significant contributions of the approach presented
here is that our tool reports an error rate! Significantly, it re-
ports an error rate that is specific for the disk on which it is run.
This is not a deficiency of the technique. On some multiuser
disks, there will be significant differences between the activity
patterns of each user, while on other disks, there will be no dis-
cernible difference. The fact that our technique can report when
it is likely to be reliable and when it is not reliable is a signifi-
cant advance for digital forensics.
C. Attacks on this Technique
As with other computer forensic techniques, there are many
ways that a knowledgeable adversary could frustrate this
technique or subvert it to frame an innocent person. The most
straightforward way to frustrate this technique would be to use
disk wiping or full disk encryption to prevent the extraction of
file placement information and metadata from the storage de-
vice. Programs such as CCleaner [12] and Apple’s Disk Utility
can also be used to erase residual information in unallocated
space.
The system presented here relies on the operating system to
distinguish which exemplars were actually used by each system
user. This approach will not work if one user manages to ob-
tain control of another user’s account, either by learning their
password or through the use of malicious software. Likewise,
it will not work for the case where multiple users share the
same account, rather than merely sharing the same user (see
Section VII-D1). Of course, these risks are already present for
any forensic examination: the work presented here merely ex-
tends this risk to the automated ascription of carved data.
Finally, an attacker could create patterns to mis-train the clas-
sifier, resulting in attribution of a file or its remnants to the incor-
rect owner. Fundamentally, this is no different than an attacker
planting digital evidence that implies a different user is guilty of
the crime. This is a problem for digital forensics in general and
is not specific to the technique presented here.
As with other forensic techniques, the existence of these
attacks does not make the contribution of this technique
less useful. Few perpetrators make use of anti-forensic tools
today, and even fewer plant digital evidence with the hope
of misdirecting investigations. While this technique makes it
possible for a perpetrator to frame an innocent party, so does
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TABLE XII
MX4-18 (C4.5) CONFUSION MATRIX; NONSYSTEM NAMES ARE BLINDED
every other digital forensics technique in use today. This tech-
nique is no more susceptible to framing and fraud than other
well-established techniques. In fact, this technique may be less
susceptible, because it uses such a large amount of data on
which to base its conclusion, the steps in the deductive process
are made visible, and because the system computes an error
rate for each use.
D. Future Work
In addition to its benefits for ascribing deleted files for law
enforcement purposes, there are some other applications of this
work. For instance, identifying orphaned/explicitly deleted and
overwritten files that left behind inode information is useful. The
techniques can also be used on files in the file system (i.e., not
deleted) to ascribe files on drives that are outside the user’s home
directory.
1) Two Users Sharing One Account: One key problem with
file ascription is the use of a single login by multiple users. The
technique presented in this paper could be modified to determine
if two or more users are sharing a single account by detecting
differences in file patterns associated with different times of day.
In a related scenario, suppose a computer is stolen, used by
the thief, and then recovered. This technique can be modified so
that the exemplars are segregated not just by account name, but
by time. This would be a straightforward modification of our
work to date.
2) Application to Noncarved Data: Although this paper is
primarily concerned with the ascription of ownership to data
that has been carved, the techniques presented in this paper can
be applied equally well to allocated data that is located on a
multiuser system that cannot be readily ascribed to one user.
This might be the case, for example, if the data is stored in a
directory that does not belong to a specific user and for which
no file ownership information is available.
3) Timeline and Geographical Correlation: Our initial set of
rules for processing timestamps could be extended to track mul-
tiple timelines in multiple locations—for example, if the dataset
contains data from three different computer systems, it would be
appropriate to create three separate timelines. Likewise, it might
be fruitful to mine the system for locale or geospatial informa-
tion and use these points for correlation.
4) Ascribing Portable Storage Devices and Cloud Storage:
There is no reason that the techniques we put forth here need
to be limited to a single hard drive. With the exception of loca-
tion on a specific hard drive (e.g., the sector number of the first
fragment), all of the metadata would be available for files stored
on portable storage devices such as USB storage devices and SD
cards. Extending this technique to handle multiple media should
be a simple matter, although it will be necessary to either detect
and correct for time shifts caused by multiple clocks, or else to
avoid using time for ascription purposes. This technique could
likewise be used to ascribe information stored in the Internet
“cloud.” In this case, the automation would be used to extract
features and automatically compare the stored document with
exemplars in a reference collection.
5) Validation Server: Although the technique presented in
this paper is effective, it is time consuming to train and validate
a classifier before using it to ascribe a file. For example, drive
0844 contained more than 20 000 files from each of the two
primary users. Our experimental system required less than 30 s
of CPU time to perform each leave-one-out validation, but this
translated to approximately a week of CPU time on a single-
processor machine.
For experimental purposes, we used a large-scale (100+
node) grid computer, but such systems are not necessary.
With the decrease in cost of multiprocessor machines with
multicoreprocessors, theperformanceproblemsofleave-one-out
validation become less severe. Once the clustering of the
drive metadata had been validated and error rates determined,
individual ascription runs could be performed on a typical
desktop computer.
6) Validation With Statistical Sampling: A typical multiuser
storage device may have tens of thousands or even hundreds of
thousands of files that belong to each user. Performing leave-
one-out validation in such a situation can be computationally
expensive, even with a cluster.
As an alternative, we plan to explore the possibility of per-
forming validation using statistical sampling. That is, instead of
performing leave-one-out validation using all of the exemplars
available for each user, we hope to evaluate the feasibility of
using a sampling of randomly selected exemplars.
7) Dimensionality Reduction: While this technique performs
quite well under the algorithm described, it may be possible to
eke out further performance improvements by applying further
dimensionality reduction techniques, such as Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA). This approach will only be effective if
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there is a high degree of correlation between attributes, some-
thing which remains to be determined.
8) Improvements Through Content Analysis: The technique
presented in this paper ignores the use of content to perform
ascription. The use of content could obviously be added to im-
prove ascription performance.
9) SVMS and Other Classifiers: Although our analysis is
confined to the KNN and C4.5 algorithms, there is clearly an op-
portunity to use more modern algorithms such as support vector
machines (SVMs) or “Boosting” algorithms for the classifica-
tion. KNN might be improved by using a weighted distance
function, so that close items would count more, or by giving
different weights to different attributes. It would also be useful
to evaluate the LazyDT algorithm [4].
10) Improved Handling of File Fragmentation: Currently
our system only concerns itself with the first fragment of files
that have multiple fragments. It may be useful to separately
process each fragment.
11) Recursive Analysis of Container Files: Most of the file
types in use today are in fact container files that can hold other
files. For example, the Microsoft Word file format is a container
format, and when a JPEG is pasted into a Microsoft Word doc-
ument the JPEG is simply embedded in the Word file’s datas-
tream.
Although some computer forensic tools will recursively
process container files for keyword searches, fiwalk will
not recursively process such files for automated metadata
extraction. Adding such a feature to fiwalk would probably
increase the accuracy of this approach, as it would provide
the classification algorithms with additional information with
which to classify.
12) Similarity of Carved Data Metric: An underlying as-
sumption of this research is that the carved data to be ascribed
has a similar distribution of metadata to some of the ascribable
data on the hard drive. This similarity can be quantified and the
accuracy of the classifer can be further refined as a function of
the distance metric.
One approach to classify the similarity would be to consider
the distance to the nearest neighbor in absolute terms. Another
would be to compare the distance between several nearest neigh-
bors with the known owner of the ascribable neighbors. Still an-
other approach would be to consider the distribution of nominal
attributions within the carved data and see if they matches at-
tributes in the training data. Applying any of these techniques
may provide additional insight into the results of the KNN clas-
sification process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated that metadata embedded inside
files can be used to predict the owner of files with a high de-
gree of accuracy, even if the file system metadata is unavail-
able. Using a forensic file system crawler and metadata extrac-
tors we can extract a single timeline of file system usage, along
with other supporting metadata. This can be used, along with
machine learning techniques, to discover exemplar files which
are similar to a file of interest, and use them to attribute the file
in question to a specific user. Furthermore, this technique can
easily be validated by a human expert, and explained to a jury,
by examining the generated timeline and the suggested exem-
plar files.
A. Code Availability
The program fiwalk that was used to extract file names
and metadata from disk images can be downloaded from
http://www.afflib.org/. fiwalk is a freely available open
source forensic framework that ingests a disk image, auto-
matically processes all partitions that might be allocated in
the disk image, examines all of the files and inodes in each
one, and outputs information about each inode in a variety of
formats, including ARFF and XML. A copy of this paper and
the ascription engine can be found in the “tools/ascription”
directory of the fiwalk source code release.
The Weka data mining toolkit used for this project can be
downloaded from http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/.
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